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Abstract
We study optimal stochastic control problems under model uncertainty. We rewrite
such problems as (zero-sum) stochastic differential games of forward-backward stochas-
tic differential equations. We prove general stochastic maximum principles for such
games, both in the zero-sum case (finding conditions for saddle points) and for the
non-zero sum games (finding conditions for Nash equilibria). We then apply these re-
sults to study optimal portfolio and consumption problems under model uncertainty.
We combine the optimality conditions given by the stochastic maximum principles with
Malliavin calculus to obtain a set of equations which determine the optimal strategies.
MSC (2010): Primary 60H10, 93E20, 91A15, 91G80
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1 Introduction
One of the aftereffects of the financial crisis is the increased awareness of the need for more
advanced modeling in mathematical finance, and a focus of attention is on the problem of
model uncertainty. This paper is motivated by a topic of this type. We consider a stochastic
system described by a general Itoˆ-Le´vy process controlled by an agent. The performance
functional is expressed as the Q-expectation of an integrated profit rate plus a terminal
payoff, where Q is a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to the original
probability measure P . We may regard Q as a scenario measure controlled by the market
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or the environment. If Q = P the problem becomes a classical stochastic control problem of
the type studied in [15]. If Q is uncertain, however, the agent might seek the strategy which
maximizes the performance in the worst possible choice of Q. This leads to a stochastic
differential game between the agent and the market. Our approach is the following: We
write the performance functional as the value at time t = 0 of the solution of an associated
backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). Thus we arrive at a (zero sum) stochastic
differential game of a system of forward-backward SDEs (FBSDEs) that we study by the
maximum principle approach.
There are several papers of related content. Stochastic control of forward-backward SDEs
(FBSDEs) has been studied in [16] and in [2] a maximum principle for stochastic differential
g-expectation games of SDEs is developed. The papers [11], [18] and [19] also study optimal
portfolio under model uncertainty by means of BSDEs, but the approaches there are strongly
linked to the exponential utility case. A key feature of the current paper is that it applies
to general utility functions and also general dynamics for the state process.
Our paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we state general stochastic maximum
principles for stochastic differential games, both in the zero-sum case (finding conditions for
saddle points) and for the non-zero sum games (finding conditions for Nash equilibria). The
proofs are given in Appendix A. In Section 3 we consider stochastic control problems under
uncertainty. We formulate these problems as (zero sum) stochastic differential games of
forward-backward SDEs (FBSDEs) and we study them by the maximum principle approach
of Section 2. In Section 4 we apply these techniques to study an optimal portfolio and
consumption problem under model uncertainty. Using the solution for linear Malliavin–
differential type equations given in [16] we arrive at a set of equations which determine the
optimal portfolio and consumption of the agent and the corresponding optimal portfolio
scenario measure of the market.
2 Maximum principles for stochastic differential games
of forward-backward stochastic differential equations
In this section, we formulate and prove a sufficient and a necessary maximum principle for
general stochastic differential games (not necessarily zero-sum games) of forward-backward
SDEs. Let (Ω, {Ft}t≥0, P ) be a filtered probability space. Consider a controlled forward
SDE of the form
dX(t) = dX(u)(t) = b(t,X(t), u(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R
γ(t,X(t), u(t), ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; X(0) = x ∈ R. (2.1)
where B is a Brownian motion, and N˜(dt, dζ) = N(dt, dζ)− ν(dζ)dt is an independent com-
pensated Poisson random measure where ν is the Le´vy measure of N such that
∫
R ζ
2ν(dζ) <
∞. We assume that IF = {Ft, t ≥ 0} is the natural filtration associated with B and N . Here
u = (u1, u2), where ui(t) is the control of player i ; i = 1, 2. We assume that we are given
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two subfiltrations
E (i)t ⊆ Ft ; t ∈ [0, T ], (2.2)
representing the information available to player i at time t ; i = 1, 2. We let Ai denote a
given set of admissible control processes for player i, contained in the set of E (i)t -predictable
processes ; i = 1, 2, with values in Ai ⊂ Rd, d ≥ 1. Denote U = A1 × A2.
We consider the associated backward SDE’s (i.e. BSDEs) in the unknowns Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ζ)
of the form
dYi(t) = −gi(t,X(t), Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ·), u(t))dt
+ Zi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
Ki(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Yi(T ) = hi(X(T )) ; i = 1, 2. (2.3)
Here gi(t, y, z, k, u) : [0, T ] × R × R × R × U → R and hi : R → R are given functions
such that the BSDEs (2.3) have unique solutions.
Let fi(t, x, u) : [0, T ] × R × U → R, ϕi(x) : R → R and ψi(x) : R → R be given profit
rates, bequest functions and “risk evaluations” respectively, of player i ; i = 1, 2. Define
Ji(u) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X
(u)(t), u(t))dt+ ϕi(X
(u)(T )) + ψi(Yi(0))
]
; i = 1, 2, (2.4)
provided the integrals and expectations exist. We call Ji(u) the performance functional of
player i ; i = 1, 2.
A Nash equilibrium for the FBSDE game (2.1)-(2.4) is a pair (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1 × A2 such
that
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1 (2.5)
and
J2(uˆ1, u2) ≤ J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u2 ∈ A2. (2.6)
Heuristically this means that player i has no incentive to deviate from the control uˆi, as
long as player j (j 6= i) does not deviate from uˆj ; i = 1, 2. Therefore a Nash equilibrium
is in some cases a likely outcome of a game. We now present a method to find it, based on
the maximum principle for stochastic control. Our result may be regarded as an extension
of the maximum principles for FBSDEs in [16] and for (forward) SDE games in [2].
Define the Hamiltonians
Hi(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) : [0, T ]× R× R× R×R× A1 × A2 × R× R× R×R → R
of this game by
Hi(t, x, y, z, k,u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) = fi(t, x, u1, u2) + λgi(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2) + pb(t, x, u1, u2)
+ qσ(t, x, u1, u2) +
∫
R
r(ζ)γ(t, x, u1, u2, ζ)ν(dζ) ; i = 1, 2, (2.7)
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where R is the set of functions from R0 into R such that the integral in (2.7) converges.
We assume that Hi is Fre´chet differentiable (C1) in the variables x, y, z, k, u and that
∇kHi(t, ζ) as a random measure is absolutely continuous with respect to ν ; i = 1, 2.
In the following, we are using the shorthand notation
∂Hi
∂y
(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t,X(t), Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ·), u1(t), u2(t), λi(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·))
and similarly for the other partial derivatives of Hi.
To these Hamiltonians we associate a system of FBSDEs in the adjoint processes λi(t),
pi(t), qi(t) and ri(t, ζ) as follows:
(i) Forward SDE in λi(t):
dλi(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t)dt+
∂Hi
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
∇kHi(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
λi(0) = ψ
′
i(Yi(0))
(
=
dψi
dy
(Yi(0))
)
.
(2.8)
(ii) Backward SDE in pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ζ):dpi(t) = −
∂Hi
∂x
(t)dt+ qi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
ri(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
pi(T ) = ϕ
′
i(X(T )) + h
′
i(X(T ))λi(T ).
(2.9)
See Appendix A for an explanation of the gradient operator ∇kHi(t, ζ) = ∇kHi(t, ζ)(·).
Theorem 2.1 (Sufficient maximum principle for FBSDE games) Let (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1×
A2 with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆi(t), Zˆi(t), Kˆi(t), λˆi(t), pˆi(t), qˆi(t), rˆi(t, ζ) of equations
(2.1), (2.3), (2.8) and (2.9) for i = 1, 2. Suppose that the following holds:
• (Concavity) The functions x→ hi(x), x→ ϕi(x), x→ ψi(x), i = 1,2
(x, y, z, k, v1)→ H1(t, x, y, z, k, v1, uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·)), (2.10)
and
(x, y, z, k, v2)→ H2(t, x, y, z, k, uˆ1(t), v2, λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·)) (2.11)
are concave.
• (The conditional maximum principle)
maxv∈A1{E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·), v, uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·)) | E (1)t ] ;
= E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·), uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·)) | E (1)t ]
(2.12)
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and similarly
maxv∈A2{E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ2(t), Zˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t, ·), u1(t), v, λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·)) | E (2)t ] ;
= E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ2(t), Zˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t, ·), uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·)) | E (2)t ]
(2.13)
• Moreover, assume the following growth conditions hold:
E
[∫ T
0
{
pˆ2i (t)
[
(σ(t)− σˆ(t))2 +
∫
R
(r(t, ζ)− rˆ(t, ζ))2ν(dζ)
]
+ (X(t)− Xˆ(t))2
[
qˆ2i (t) +
∫
R
rˆ2i (t, ζ)ν(dζ)
]
+ (Yi(t)− Yˆi(t))2
(∂Hˆi
∂z
)2
(t) +
∫
R
∥∥∥∇kHˆi(t, ζ)∥∥∥2 ν(dζ)

+λˆ21(t)
[
(Zi(t)− Zˆi(t))2 +
∫
R
(Ki(t, ζ)− Kˆi(t, ζ))2ν(dζ)
]}
dt
]
<∞ for i = 1, 2.
(2.14)
Then uˆ(t) = (uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t)) is a Nash equilibrium for (2.1)(2.4).
Remark 2.2 Above we have used the following shorthand notation:
If i = 1, then X(t) = X(u1,uˆ2)(t) and Y1(t) = Y
(u1,uˆ2)
1 (t) are the processes corresponding
to the control u(t) = (u1(t), uˆ2(t)), while Xˆ(t) = X
(uˆ)(t) and Yˆ1(t) = Y
(uˆ)
1 (t) are those
corresponding to the control uˆ(t) = (uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t)). An analogue notation is used for i = 2.
Moreover, we put
∂Hˆi
∂x
(t) =
∂Hi
∂x
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆi(t), Zˆi(t), Kˆi(t, ·), uˆ(t), λˆi(t), pˆi(t), qˆi(t), rˆi(t, ·))
and similarly with
∂Hˆi
∂z
(t) and ∇kHˆi(t, ζ), i = 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
It is also of interest to prove a version of the maximum principle which does not require the
concavity conditions (2.10). One such version is the following necessary maximum principle
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(Theorem 2.3) which requires the following assumptions:
• For all t0 ∈ [0, T ] and all bounded, E (i)t -measurable random variables αi(ω),
the control βi(t) := χ(t0,T )(t)αi(ω) belongs to Ai ; i = 1, 2 (2.15)
• For all ui, βi ∈ Ai with βi bounded there exists δi > 0 such that the control
u˜i(t) := ui(t) + sβi(t) ; t ∈ [0, T ] belongs to Ai for all s ∈ (−δi, δi) ; i = 1, 2. (2.16)
• The following derivative processes exist and belong to L2([0, T ]× Ω) : (2.17)
x1(t) =
d
ds
X(u1+sβ1,u2)(t) |s=0 ; y1(t) = d
ds
Y
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t) |s=0
z1(t) =
d
ds
Z
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t) |s=0 ; k1(t, ζ) =
d
ds
K
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t) |s=0
and, similarly x2(t) =
d
ds
X(u1,u2+sβ2)(t) |s=0 etc.
Note that since X(u)(0) = x for all u we have xi(0) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
In the following we write
∂b
∂x
(t) for
∂b
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t)) etc.
By (2.1) and (2.3) we have
dx1(t) =
{
∂b
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+
{
∂σ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dB(t)
+
∫
R
{
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)x1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t)
}
N˜(dt, dζ), (2.18)
dy1(t) = −
{
∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t) +
∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t)
+
∫
R
∇kg1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ) + ∂g1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt
+ zi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
k1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
y1(T ) = h
′
1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))x1(T ), (2.19)
and similarly for dx2(t), dy2(t).
We are now ready to state a necessary maximum principle, which is an extension of
Theorem 3.1 in [2] and Theorem 3.1 in [16]. In the sequel, ∂H
∂v
means ∇vH.
Theorem 2.3 (Necessary maximum principle) Suppose u ∈ A with corresponding so-
lutions X(t), Yi(t), Zi(t), Ki(t, ζ), λi(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ζ) of equations (2.1), (2.3), (2.8) and
(2.9). Suppose (2.15), (2.16) and (2.17) hold.
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Moreover, assume that
E
[∫ T
0
{
p2i (t)
[(
∂σ
∂x
(t)xi(t) +
∂σ
∂ui
(t)βi(t)
)2
+
∫
R
(
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)xi(t) +
∂γ
∂ui
(t, ζ)βi(t)
)2
ν(dζ)
]
+ x2i (t)(q
2
i (t) +
∫
R
r2i (t, ζ)ν(dζ))
+ λ2i (t)(z
2
i (t) +
∫
R
k2i (t, ζ)ν(dζ))
+y2i (t)
(
(
∂Hi
∂z
)2(t) +
∫
R
‖∇kHi(t, ζ)‖2 ν(dζ)
)}]
dt <∞ for i = 1, 2. (2.20)
Then the following are equivalent:
(i)
d
ds
J1(u1 + sβ1, u2) |s=0= d
ds
J2(u1, u2 + sβ2) |s=0= 0
for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2.
(ii)
E
[
∂
∂v1
H1(t,X(t), Y1(t), Z1(t), K1(t, ·), v1, u2(t), λ1(t), p1(t)q1(t), r1(t, ·)) | E (1)t
]
v1=u1(t)
= E
[
∂
∂v2
H2(t,X(t), Y2(t), Z2(t), K2(t, ·), u1(t), v2, λ2(t), p2(t), q2(t), r2(t, ·)) | E (2)t
]
v2=u2(t)
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The zero-sum game case. In the zero-sum case we have
J1(u1, u2) + J2(u1, u2) = 0. (2.21)
Then the Nash equilibrium (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1 ×A2 satisfying (2.5)-(2.6) becomes a saddle point
for J(u1, u2) := J1(u1, u2). To see this, note that (2.5)-(2.6) imply that
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) = −J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) ≤ −J2(uˆ1, u2)
and hence
J(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J(uˆ1, uˆ2) ≤ J(uˆ1, u2) for all u1, u2.
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From this we deduce that
inf
u2∈A2
sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, u2) ≤ sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J(uˆ1, uˆ2)
≤ inf
u2∈A2
J(uˆ1, u2) ≤ sup
u1∈A1
inf
u2∈A2
J(u1, u2). (2.22)
Since we always have inf sup ≥ sup inf, we conclude that
inf
u2∈A2
sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, u2) = sup
u1∈A1
J(u1, uˆ2) = J(uˆ1, uˆ2)
= inf
u2∈A2
J(uˆ1, u2) = sup
u1∈A1
inf
u2∈A2
J(u1, u2). (2.23)
i.e. (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is a saddle point for J(u1, u2).
We know state the necessary maximum principle for the zero sum game problem:
Choose gi = g, hi = h, f1 = f = −f2, ϕ1 = ϕ = −ϕ2 and ψ1 = ψ = −ψ2 ; i = 1, 2. For
u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1 ×A2 define
J(u1, u2) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X(u)(t), u(t))dt+ ϕ(X(u)(T )) + ψ(Y (0))
]
, (2.24)
where X(u)(t), Y (t) = Yi(t), Z(t) = Zi(t) and K(t, ζ) = Ki(t, ζ) are defined by (2.1) and
(2.3). Then by (2.7) the Hamiltonians are
H1(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) = f(t, x, u1, u2) + λg(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2) + pb(t, x, u1, u2)
+ qσ(t, x, u1, u2) +
∫
R
r(ζ)γ(t, x, u1, u2, ζ)ν(dζ), (2.25)
H2(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r) = H1(t, x, y, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r)− 2f(t, x, u1, u2). (2.26)
Let λ = λi, pi, qi and ri i = 1, 2 be as in (2.8)-(2.9).
Theorem 2.4 (Necessary maximum principle for zero-sum forward-backward games)
Assume the conditions of Theorem 2.3 hold. Then the following are equivalent:
(i)
d
ds
J(u1 + sβ1, u2) |s=0= d
ds
J(u1, u2 + sβ2) |s=0= 0 (2.27)
for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2.
(ii)
E
[
∂
∂v1
H1(t,X(t), Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ·), v1, u2(t), λ(t), p1(t), q1(t), r1(t, ·)) | E (1)t
]
v1=u1(t)
= E
[
∂
∂v2
H2(t,X(t), Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ·), u1(t), v2, λ(t), p2(t), q2(t), r2(t, ·)) | E (2)t
]
v2=u2(t)
= 0. (2.28)
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Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.3. 
Corollary 2.5 Let u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1 × A2 be a Nash equilibrium (saddle point) for the
zero-sum game in Theorem 2.4. Then (2.28) holds.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.4 by noting that if u = (u1, u2) is a Nash equilibrium,
then (2.27) holds by (2.23). 
3 Stochastic control under model uncertainty
Let X(t) = Xvx(t) be a controlled Itoˆ–Le´vy process of the form
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), v(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), v(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R
γ(t,X(t), v(t), ζ)N˜(dt, dζ) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
X(0) = x ∈ R (3.1)
where v(·) is the control process.
We consider a model uncertainty setup, represented by a probability measure Q = Qθ
which is equivalent to P , with the Radon-Nikodym derivative on Ft given by
d(Q | Ft)
d(P | Ft) = G
θ(t) (3.2)
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Gθ(t) is a martingale of the form
dGθ(t) = Gθ(t−)[θ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]
Gθ(0) = 1. (3.3)
Here θ = (θ0, θ1) may be regarded as a scenario control. Let A1 denote a given family
of admissible controls v and A2 denote a given set of admissible scenario controls θ such
that E[
∫ T
0
{|θ20(t)| +
∫
R θ
2
1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt] < ∞ and θ1(t, ζ) ≥ −1 +  for some  > 0. Let
E (1)0≤t≤T and E (2)0≤t≤T be given subfiltrations of F0≤t≤T , representing the information available
to the controllers at time t. It is required that v ∈ A1 be E1t -predictable, and θ ∈ A2 be
E2t -predictable. We consider the stochastic differential game to find (vˆ, θˆ) ∈ A1 × A2 such
that
sup
v∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
EQθ [W (v, θ)] = EQθˆ [W (vˆ, θˆ)] = infθ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
EQθ [W (v, θ)], (3.4)
where
W (v, θ) = U2(X
v(T )) +
∫ T
0
U1(s,X
v(s), v(s))ds+
∫ T
0
ρ(θ(t))dt. (3.5)
9
Here, U1 : [0, T ] × R × V → R and U2 : R → R are given functions, concave and
increasing with a strictly decreasing derivative, and ρ is a convex function. The term
Λ(θ) := EQθ [
∫ T
0
ρ(θ(t))dt] can be seen as a penalty term, penalizing the difference between
Qθ and the original probability measure P .
Put
F (t, x, u) = U1(t, x, v) + ρ(θ); u = (v, θ) = (c, pi, θ0, θ1). (3.6)
Then
EQθ [W (v, θ)] = E[G
θ(T )U2(X
v(T )) +
∫ T
0
Gθ(s)F (s,Xv(s), u(s))ds]. (3.7)
We now define Y (t) = Y v,θ(t) by
Y (t) = E[
Gθ(T )
Gθ(t)
U2(X
v(T )) +
∫ T
t
Gθ(s)
Gθ(t)
F (s,Xv(s), u(s))ds | Ft]; t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.8)
Then we recognize Y (t) as the solution of the linear BSDE (see Lemma B.1)
dY (t) = −[F (t,Xv(t), u(t)) + θ0(t)Z(t) +
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ)]dt
+ Z(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.9)
Y (T ) = U2(X
v(T )).
Note that
Y (0) = Y v,θ(0) = EQθ [W (v, θ)]. (3.10)
Therefore the problem (3.4) can be written
sup
v∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
Y v,θ(0) = Y vˆ,θˆ(0) = inf
θ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
Y v,θ(0), (3.11)
where Y v,θ(t) is given by the forward-backward system (3.1) & (3.9). This is a zero-sum
stochastic differential game (SDG) of forward-backward SDEs of the form (2.24) with f =
ϕ = 0 and ψ = Id.
Proceeding as in Section 2, define the Hamiltonian
H : [0, T ]× R× R× R0 ×R× A1 × A2 × R× R× R×R → R
by
H(t, x, y, z, k, v, θ, λ, p, q, r) = [F (t, x, u) + θ0z +
∫
R
θ1(ζ)k(ζ)ν(dζ)]λ
+b(t, x, v)p+ σ(t, x, v)q +
∫
R
γ(t, x, v, ζ)r(ζ)ν(dζ). (3.12)
where R is the set of functions r : R0 → R such that (3.12) converge. Define a pair of
FBSDEs in the adjoint processes λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ) as follows:
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Forward SDE for λ(t):
dλ(t) =
∂H
∂y
(t)dt+
∂H
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
∇kH(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
= λ(t)θ0(t)dB(t) + λ(t)
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)(·)N˜(dt, dζ); t ∈ [0, T ]
λ(0) = 1 (3.13)
Backward SDE for p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ):
dp(t) = −∂H
∂x
(t)dt+ q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
= −{∂F
∂x
(t) + p(t)
∂b
∂x
(t) + q(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt
+ q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ); t ∈ [0, T ]
p(T ) = λ(T )U ′2(X(T )). (3.14)
Here we have used the abbreviated notation
∂H
∂y
(t) =
∂H
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), Z(t), K(t, ·), v(t), θ(t), λ(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ·))
and similarly for the other partial derivatives. We now present a necessary maximum prin-
ciple for the forward-backward stochastic differential game (3.1), (3.9), (3.11) by adapting
Theorem 2.4 to this case.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 2.3 hold. Let (vˆ, θˆ) ∈ A1 × A2,
with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Zˆ(t), Kˆ(t, ·), λˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), rˆ(t, ·) of equations (3.1),
(3.9), (3.14) and (3.13). Suppose (3.11) holds, together with (2.14). Then the following
holds:
E[λˆ(t)
∂U1
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t)) + pˆ(t)
∂b
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t))
+qˆ(t)
∂σ
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t)) +
∫
R
rˆ(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂v
(t, Xˆ(t), vˆ(t), ζ)ν(dζ) | E (1)t ] = 0
E[λˆ(t)(
∂ρ
∂θ0
(θˆ(t)) + Zˆ(t)) | E (2)t ] = 0
E[λˆ(t)(∇θ1F (t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t)) +
∫
R
(·)Kˆ(t, ζ)ν(dζ)) | E (2)t ] = 0.
Note that both ∇θ1F and
∫
R(·)Kˆ(t, ζ)ν(dζ)) are linear functionals, the latter being defined
by the action
ϕ→
∫
R
ϕ(ζ)Kˆ(t, ζ)ν(dζ)
for all bounded continuous functions ϕ : R0 7→ R.
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4 Portfolio and consumption problem under model un-
certainty
We now apply this to the following portfolio and consumption problem under model uncer-
tainty. Consider a financial market consisting of a bond with unit price S0(t) = 1 ; 0 ≤ t ≤
T, and a stock, with unit price S(t) given by
dS(t) = S(t−)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
γ0(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)], (4.1)
where b0(t) = b0(t, ω), σ0(t) = σ0(t, ω) and γ0(t, ζ) = γ0(t, ζ, ω) are given {Ft}-predictable
processes such that γ0 ≥ −1 +  for some  > 0 and
E[
∫ T
0
{|b0(t)|+ σ20(t) +
∫
R
γ20(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt] <∞.
Note that this system is non–Markovian since the coefficients are random processes.
We introduce the state price density Γ(t) defined by
Γ(t) := exp(
∫ t
0
− b0(s)
σ0(s)
dB(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
(
b0(s)
σ0(s)
)2ds). (4.2)
Let X(t) = Xv(t) be the wealth process corresponding to a portfolio pi(t) and a con-
sumption rate c(t), i.e.{
dX(t) = pi(t)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R γ0(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]− c(t)dt, t ∈ [0, T ]
X(0) = x ∈ R, (4.3)
and put v = (pi, c). We consider the stochastic differential game (3.4)-(3.5). For i = 1, 2, Ii
will denote the inverse of U ′i , in the sense that
Ii(y) =
{
(U ′i)
−1(y); 0 ≤ y ≤ yi
0 y > yi
(4.4)
where yi = limx→0+ U ′i(x). We assume that ρ
′(θ) has an inverse.
We have seen in Section 3, that the problem (3.4)-(3.5) can be written as
sup
v∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
Y v,θ(0) = Y vˆ,θˆ(0) = inf
θ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
Y v,θ(0), (4.5)
where Y (t) = Y v,θ(t) is given by equation (3.9) and (4.3).
We now apply the necessary maximum principle given by Theorem 3.1. The Hamiltonian
for the problem (4.5) is, by (3.12),
H(t, x, y, z, k, v, θ, λ, p, q, r) = [U1(t, c) + ρ(θ) + θ0z +
∫
R
θ1(ζ)k(ζ)ν(dζ)]λ
+(pib0(t)− c)p+ piσ0(t)q + pi
∫
R
γ0(t, ζ)r(ζ)ν(dζ).
12
The forward SDE for λ(t) = λθ(t) and the BSDE for p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ) are (see (3.13)- (3.14))
dλ(t) = λ(t)[θ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
θ1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]; t ∈ [0, T ]
λ(0) = 1 (4.6)
dp(t) = q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dz); t ∈ [0, T ]
p(T ) = λ(T )U ′2(X(T )). (4.7)
Maximizing H with respect to (c, pi) gives the following first order conditions:
E[λ(t) | E (1)t ]
∂U1
∂c
(t, c(t)) = E[p(t) | E (1)t ] (4.8)
E[b0(t)p(t) + σ0(t)q(t) +
∫
R
γ0(t, ζ)r(t, ζ)ν(dζ) | E (1)t ] = 0 (4.9)
Minimizing H with respect to θ = (θ0, θ1) gives the following first order conditions:
∂ρ
∂θ0
(θ(t)) + E[Z(t) | E (2)t ] = 0 (4.10)
∇θ1ρ(θ(t))(·) + E[
∫
R
(·)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ) | E (2)t ] = 0 (4.11)
We now restrict ourselves to the case when there are no jumps, i.e. N˜ = ν = K =
θ1 = 0 and E (1)t = E (2)t = Ft. For simplicity of notation, we write θ instead of θ0. Then
equations (4.6)-(4.11) simplify to:
λ(t) = exp(
∫ t
0
θ(s)dB(s)−
∫ t
0
1
2
θ2(s)ds) (4.12)
p(t) = E[λ(T )U ′2(X(T )) | Ft] ; (4.13)
λ(t)
∂U1
∂c
(t, c(t)) = p(t) (4.14)
b0(t)p(t) + σ0(t)q(t) = 0 (4.15)
ρ′(θ(t)) + Z(t) = 0 (4.16)
and by the generalized Clark-Ocone formula [1],
q(t) = E[Dt(λ(T )U
′
2(X(T ))) | Ft], (4.17)
where Dt denotes the Malliavin derivative at t with respect to B(·). (See e.g. [7]).
The FBSDEs (4.3)-(3.9) simplify to:
dX(t) = pi(t)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t)]− c(t)dt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
X(0) = x > 0 (4.18)
dY (t) = −[U1(t, c(t)) + ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)Z(t)]dt+ Z(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y (T ) = U2(X(T )). (4.19)
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Put
R = p(T ) = λ(T )U ′2(X(T )). (4.20)
Then (4.15) can be written
b0(t)E[R | Ft] + σ0(t)E[DtR | Ft] = 0. (4.21)
Following [16] we call this a Malliavin-differential type equation in the unknown random
variable R. By Theorem A.1 in [16], the general solution of this equation is R = Rβ(T );
where
Rβ(t) = βΓ(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.22)
for some constant β, where Γ(t) is defined in (4.2). Note that Rβ(t) is a martingale. Hence
since p(T ) = Rβ(T ), we get by (4.13) that
p(t) = Rβ(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.23)
Modulo the unknown constant β we can now find the optimal terminal wealth Xβ(T ) by
(4.20) as follows:
Xβ(T ) = I2(
βΓ(T )
λ(T )
), (4.24)
Similarly the optimal consumption rate is, by (4.14),
c(t) = cβ(t) = I1(t,
βΓ(t)
λ(t)
); 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4.25)
The optimal scenario parameter is, by (4.16)
θ(t) = θβ(t) = (ρ′)−1(−Zβ(t)); 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4.26)
where (Yβ(t), Zβ(t)) is the solution of the corresponding BSDE (4.19), i.e.
dYβ(t) = −[U1(t, cβ(t)) + ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)Zβ(t)]dt+ Zβ(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Yβ(T ) = U2(I2(
βΓ(T )
λ(T )
)). (4.27)
Let us consider the case when
U1 = c = 0 (no consumption) and ρ(θ) =
1
2
θ2. (4.28)
Substituting (4.26) into (4.27), we getdYβ(t) =
1
2
θ2(t)dt− θ(t)dB(t) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Yβ(T ) = U2(I2(
βΓ(T )
λ(T )
)).
(4.29)
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Integrating (4.29), and using (4.12) at t = T , we get
−1
2
∫ T
0
θ2(s)ds+
∫ T
0
θ(s)dB(s) = Yβ(0)− U2(I2(β Γ(T )
λ(T )
)). (4.30)
Taking exponentials in (4.30) we obtain
λ(T ) = exp
(∫ T
0
θ(s)dB(s)− 1
2
∫ T
0
θ2(s)ds
)
=
expYβ(0)
exp(U2(I2(
β Γ(T )
λ(T )
)))
. (4.31)
Therefore λ(t) is given as the solution of the BSDE (or more precisely SDE with terminal
condition) {
dλ(t) = λ(t)θ(t)dB(t) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
λθ(T ) = L
(4.32)
where L = L(β, Yβ(0)) is the solution of the equation:
L exp(U2(I2(
β Γ(T )
L
))) = expYβ(0). (4.33)
By the generalized Clark-Ocone formula [1] this gives
λ(t)θ(t) = E[DtL | Ft] ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.34)
By (4.6) and (4.34), we have:{
dλ(t) = E[DtL | Ft]dB(t) ; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
λ(0) = 1
(4.35)
and
θ(t) =
E[DtL | Ft]
λ(t)
; 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.36)
Note that E[L] = 1 by the martingale property of λ(t).
It remains to determine β and Yβ(0). To this end, we consider the equation (4.18) for
X(t) as a BSDE as follows:
Put
Z˜β(t) = pi(t)σ0(t).
Then
pi(t) =
Z˜β(t)
σ0(t)
(4.37)
and (4.18) becomes, using (4.24),
dX(t) =
b0(t)
σ0(t)
Z˜β(t)dt+ Z˜β(t)dB(t); (4.38)
X(T ) = I2(
β Γ(T )
L
). (4.39)
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The solution of this linear BSDE is
X(t) = E[I2(
β Γ(T )
L
) exp(
∫ T
t
−1
2
(
b0(s)
σ0(s)
)2ds−
∫ T
t
b0(s)
σ0(s)
dB(s)) | Ft]
= E[I2(
β Γ(T )
L
)
Γ(T )
Γ(t)
| Ft]. (4.40)
In particular, putting t = 0, we get
x = E[I2(
β Γ(T )
L
)Γ(T )]. (4.41)
Finally, by taking expectation in (4.30), we deduce that
Yβ(0) = E
[
U2(I2(
β Γ(T )
L
))− 1
2
∫ T
0
θ2(s))ds
]
(4.42)
which, together with (4.41) gives the value of β and the solution Yβ(0) = Y
pˆi,θˆ(0) of (3.11).
We summarize what we have proved
Theorem 4.1 Consider the problem to find (pˆi, θˆ) such that
sup
pi∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
EQθ [W (v, θ)] = EQθˆ [W (pˆi, θˆ)] = infθ∈A2
sup
v∈A1
EQθ [W (pi, θ)], (4.43)
with
W (pi, θ) = lnXpi(T ) +
∫ T
0
θ(t)2dt (4.44)
where
dX(t) = pi(t)[b0(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t)], 0 ≤ t ≤ T
X(0) = x > 0. (4.45)
This problem is equivalent to
sup
pi∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
Y pi,θ(0) = Y pˆi,θˆ(0) = inf
θ∈A2
sup
pi∈A1
Y v,θ(0), (4.46)
where Y = Y pi,θ is given by
dY (t) = −[1
2
θ(t)2 + θ(t)Z(t)]dt+ Z(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y (T ) = U2(X(T )). (4.47)
Then, the optimal scenario parameter θˆ is given by (4.36)-(4.35). The optimal portfolio pˆi is
given by
pˆi =
DtXˆ(t)
σ0(t)
where Xˆ(t) is the optimal state process given by (4.40), with β and Yβ(0) given by (4.41)-
(4.42) with θ = θˆ, and hence L = L(β, Yβ(0)) given by (4.33).
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Proof. The argument above shows that, by the necessary maximum principle (Theo-
rem 3.1), if there is an optimal pair (pˆi, θˆ), then it is given as in the theorem.
Conversely, if we define (pˆi, θˆ) as in the theorem, we can show that (pˆi, θˆ) must be optimal,
as follows:
Fix an arbitrary pi ∈ A1 in the BSDE (4.47). Then, proceeding as in [19], by the
comparison theorem for BSDEs, we obtain the minimal value Y pi,θˆ(0) and its minimizer θˆ
simply by minimizing the driver of (4.47), i.e. by minimizing for each t and ω the function:
θ 7→ 1
2
θ2 + θZ(t).
This gives
θˆ(t) = −Z(t), (4.48)
which is identical to (4.16). Substituting this into (4.47), we have reduced the original game
problem to the following FBSDE control problem:
Find pˆi ∈ A1 such that
sup
pi∈A1
Y pi(0) = Y pˆi(0), (4.49)
where
dY pi(t) =
1
2
Z(t)2dt+ Z(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y pi(T ) = U2(X
pi(T )) (4.50)
and Xpi(t) given in (4.45). This problem is of the type discussed in [16]. If we apply the
sufficient maximum principle (Theorem 2.3) of that paper, we get that the optimal pˆi is given
as the maximizer pi of the associated Hamiltonian:
H0(t, x, y, z, pi, λ, p, q) := −1
2
λz2 + pi(p b0(t) + qσ0(t)). (4.51)
This gives the equation
p(t) b0(t) + q(t)σ0(t) = 0, (4.52)
which is (4.15). Moreover, again by Theorem 2.3 in [16], the equation for the associated
process λ(t) is
dλ(t) = −Z(t)λ(t)dB(t) = λ(t)θ(t)dB(t), (4.53)
λ(0) = 1 (4.54)
which is (4.12). We conclude that, since the pair (pˆi, θˆ) of Theorem 4.1 does indeed satisfy
the sufficient conditions (4.48), (4.52), and (4.53), it also satisfies all the conditions of the
sufficient maximum principle of Theorem 2.3 in [16] and hence the pair is optimal. 
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The logarithmic utility case. In this case, substituting U2(x) = lnx and I2(x) =
1
x
in
the general formulas above, we get:
β =
1
x
(4.55)
L =
Γ(T )1/2
E[Γ(T )1/2]
(4.56)
Yβ(0) = ln x+ E
[∫ T
0
(
1
2
(
b0(s)
σ0(s)
)2 − θ2(s))ds
]
(4.57)
Xˆ(t) = x
E[Γ(T )1/2 | Ft]
E[Γ(T )1/2]Γ(t)
. (4.58)
The case with no model uncertainty. In this case, θ = 0 and λ = 1 and the problem
reduces to maximizing
Y (0) = E[
∫ T
O
U1(t, c(t))dt+ U2(X(T ))]
which is a classical optimal portfolio/consumption problem. Then the optimal terminal
wealth X(T ) is given by :
Xβ(T ) = I2(βΓ(T ))
and by (4.25), and the optimal consumption rate c(t) is given by
cβ(t) = I1(t, βΓ(t)).
To find the unknown β, we consider the equation (4.18) for X(t) as a BSDE as follows: Put
Z˜β(t) = pi(t)σ0(t).
Then
pi(t) =
Z˜β(t)
σ0(t)
(4.59)
and (4.18) becomes, using (4.24),
dX(t) = (
b0(t)
σ0(t)
Z˜β(t)− I1(t, βΓ(t)))dt+ Z˜β(t)dB(t); (4.60)
X(T ) = I2(βΓ(T )) (4.61)
The solution of this linear BSDE is
X(t) = E[I2(β.Γ(T ))
Γ(T )
Γ(t)
+
∫ T
t
Γ(s)
Γ(t)
I1(s, β.Γ(s))ds | Ft].
Putting t = 0, we get
x = E[I2(βΓ(T ))Γ(T ) +
∫ T
0
Γ(s)I1(s, βΓ(s))ds]
and this equation determines β. We thus recover by a completely different method the results
obtained by the classical martingale method, (see e.g. [5], Chapter 3).
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A Proofs of the maximum principles for FBSDE games
We first recall some basic concepts and results from Banach space theory. Let V be an open
subset of a Banach space X with norm ‖ · ‖ and let F : V → R.
(i) We say that F has a directional derivative (or Gaˆtaux derivative) at x ∈ X in the
direction y ∈ X if
DyF (x) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
(F (x+ εy)− F (x))
exists.
(ii) We say that F is a Fre´chet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a linear map
L := X → R
such that
lim
h→0
h∈X
1
‖h‖|F (x+ h)− F (x)− L(h)| = 0.
In this case we call L the gradient (or Fre´chet derivative) of F at x and we write
L = ∇xF.
(iii) If F is Fre´chet differentiable, then F has a directional derivative in all directions y ∈ X
and
DyF (x) = ∇xF (y).
Proof of Theorem 2.1 (Sufficient maximum principle). We first prove that
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1.
To this end, fix u1 ∈ A1 and consider
∆ := J1(u1, uˆ2)− J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) = I1 + I2 + I3, (A.1)
where
I1 = E
[∫ T
0
{f1(t,X(t), u(t))− f1(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t))}dt
]
(A.2)
I2 = E[ϕ1(X(T ))− ϕ1(Xˆ(T ))] (A.3)
I3 = E[ψ1(Y1(0))− ψ1(Yˆ1(0))]. (A.4)
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By (2.7) and concavity of H1 we have
I1 = E
[∫ T
0
{H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)− λˆ1(t)(g1(t)− gˆ1(t))− pˆ1(t)(b(t)− bˆ(t))
−qˆ1(t)(σ(t)− σˆ(t))−
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)
}
dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
{
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t)(X(t)− Xˆ(t)) + ∂Hˆ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t)) + ∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))
+
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ) + ∂Hˆ1
∂u1
(t)(u1(t)− uˆ1(t))
− pˆ1(t)(b(t)− bˆ(t))− qˆ1(t)(σ(t)− σˆ(t))
−
∫
R
rˆ(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)− λˆ1(g1(t)− gˆ1(t))
}
dt
]
(A.5)
where we have used the shortland notation
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t) =
∂H1
∂x
(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·), uˆ(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t)rˆ1(t, ·)), etc.
By concavity, of ϕ1, (2.9) and the Itoˆ formula,
I2 ≤ E[ϕ′1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E[pˆ1(T )(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
− E[λˆ1(T )h′1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E
[∫ T
0
pˆ1(t
−)(dX(t)− dXˆ(t)) +
∫ T
0
(X(t−)− Xˆ(t−))dpˆ1(t)
+
∫ T
0
qˆ1(t)(σ(t)− σˆ(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]
− E[λˆ1(T )h′1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E
[∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)(b(t)− bˆ(t))dt+
∫ T
0
(X(t)− Xˆ(t))
(
−∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t)
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
qˆ1(t)(σ(t)− σˆ(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]
− E[λˆ1(T )h′1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]. (A.6)
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By concavity of ψ1, (2.8), and concavity of ϕ1 :
I3 = E[ψ1(Y1(0))− ψ1(Yˆ1(0))]
≤ E[ψ′1(Yˆ1(0))(Y1(0)− Yˆ1(0))]
= E[λˆ1(0)(Y1(0)− Yˆ1(0))]
= E[(Y1(T )− Yˆ1(T ))λˆ1(T )]
−
{
E
[∫ T
0
(Y1(t
−)− Yˆ1(t−))dλˆ1(t) +
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t
−)(dY1(t)− dYˆ1(t))
+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]}
= E[(h1(X(T ))− h1(Xˆ(T )))λˆ1(T )]
−
{
E
[∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t)(−g1(t) + gˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]}
≤ E[λˆ1(T )h′1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
−
{
E
[∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Yˆ (t))dt
+
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t)(−g1(t) + gˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t, ζ)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt
]}
. (A.7)
Adding (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) we get
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∆ = I1 + I2 + I3
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂u1
(t)(u1(t)− uˆ1(t))dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
E
[
∂H1
∂u
(t)(u1(t)− uˆ1(t)) | E (1)t
]
dt
]
≤ 0,
by the maximum condition (2.12). Hence
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1.
The inequality
J2(uˆ1, u2) ≤ J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u2 ∈ A2
is proved similarly. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1. 
Proof of Theorem 2.3(Necessary maximum principle) Consider
D1 :=
d
ds
J1(u1 + sβ1, u2) |s=0
= E
[∫ T
0
{
∂f1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂f1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+ ϕ′1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))x1(T ) + ψ
′
1(Y1(0))y1(0)
]
.
(A.8)
By (2.9), (2.14) and the Itoˆ formula,
E[ϕ′1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))x1(T )]
= E[p1(T )x1(T )]− E[h′1(X(u1,u2)(T ))λ1(T )]
= E
[∫ T
0
{
p1(t
−)dx1(t) + x1(t−)dp1(t) + q1(t)
[
∂σ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
dt
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
[
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)x1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t, ζ)
]
ν(dζ)dt
}]
− E[h′1(X(u1,u2)(T ))λ1(T )]
= E
[∫ T
0
{
p1(t)
[
∂b
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
+ x1(t)
(
−∂H1
∂x
(t)
)
+ q1(t)
[
∂σ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
[
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)x1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t, ζ)
]
ν(dζ)
}
dt
]
− E[h′1(X(u1,u2)(T ))λ1((T )]. (A.9)
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By (2.8), (2.14) and the Itoˆ formula
E[ψ′1(Y1(0))y1(0)] = E[λ1(0)y1(0)]
= E[λ1(T )y1(T )]− E
[∫ T
0
{λ1(t−)dy1(t) + y1(t−)dλ1(t)
+
∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t)dt+
∫
R
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)dt
]
= E[λ1(T )h
′
1(X
(u1,u2)(T ))]
− E
[∫ T
0
{
λ1(t)
[
−∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t)− ∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t)− ∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t)
−
∫
R
∇kg1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)− ∂g1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
]
+
∂H1
∂y
(t)y1(t) +
∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t) +
∫
R
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)
}
dt
]
. (A.10)
Adding (A.9) and (A.10) we get, by (A.8),
D1 = E
[∫ T
0
{[
∂f1
∂x
(t) + p1(t)
∂b
∂x
(t) + q1(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t)
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)ν(dζ)− ∂H1
∂x
(t) + λ1(t)
∂g1
∂x
(t)
]
x1(t)
+
[
−∂H1
∂y
(t) + λ1(t)
∂g1
∂y
(t)
]
y1(t)
+
[
−∂H1
∂z
(t) + λ1(t)
∂g1
∂z
(t)
]
z1(t)
+
∫
R
[−∇kH1(t, ζ) + λ1(t)∇kg1(t, ζ)] k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)
+
[
∂f1
∂u1
(t) + p1(t)
∂b
∂u1
(t) + q1(t)
∂σ
∂u1
(t)
+
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)ν(dζ) +
∂g1
∂u1
(t)
]
β1(t)
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t) | E (1)t
]
dt
]
. (A.11)
If D1 = 0 for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, then this holds in particular for β1 of the form in
(a1), i.e.
β1(t) = χ(t0,T ](t)α1(ω),
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where α1(ω) is bounded and E (1)t0 -measurable. Hence
E
[∫ T
t0
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t) | E (1)t
]
α1dt
]
= 0.
Differentiating with respect to t0 we get
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t0)α1
]
= 0 for a.a. t0.
Since this holds for all bounded E (1)t0 -measurable random variables α1 we conclude that
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t) | E (1)t
]
= 0 for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ].
A similar argument gives that
E
[
∂H2
∂u2
(t) | E (2)t
]
= 0
provided that
D2 :=
d
ds
J2(u1, u2 + sβ2) |s=0= 0 for all bounded β2 ∈ A2.
This shows that (i)⇒ (ii). The argument above can be reversed, to give that (ii)⇒ (i). We
omit the details. 
B Linear BSDEs with jumps
Lemma B.1 [Linear BSDEs with jumps]. Let F be a FT -measurable and square-integrable
random variable. Let β and ξ0 be bounded predictable processes and ξ1 a predictable process
such that ξ1(t, ζ) ≥ C1 with C1 > −1 and |ξ1(t, ζ)| ≤ C2(1 ∧ |ζ|) for a constant C2 ≥ 0. Let
ϕ be a predictable process such that E[
∫ T
0
ϕ2(t)dt] <∞. Then the linear BSDE
dY (t) = −[ϕ(t) + β(t)Y (t) + ξ0(t)Z(t) +
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ)]dt
+ Z(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Y (T ) = F (B.1)
has the unique solution
Y (t) = E[F Υ(t, T ) +
∫ T
t
Υ(t, s)ϕ(s)ds | Ft]; 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (B.2)
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where Υ(t, s); 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T ; is defined by
dΥ(t, s) = Υ(t, s−)[β(s)ds+ ξ0(s)dB(s) +
∫
R
ξ1(s, ζ)N˜(ds, dζ)]; t ≤ s ≤ T
Υ(t, t) = 1 (B.3)
i.e.
Υ(t, s) = exp(
∫ s
t
{β(u)− 1
2
ξ20(u)}du+
∫ s
t
ξ0(u)dB(u)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R
{ln(1 + ξ1(u))− ξ1(u)}ν(dζ)du+
∫ s
t
∫
R
ln(1 + ξ1(u))N˜(du, dζ)). (B.4)
Hence
Υ(t, s) =
Υ(0, s)
Υ(0, t)
, Υ(t, T ) =
Υ(0, T )
Υ(0, t)
.
Proof. For completeness we give the proof, but it is also given in [21]. Existence and
uniqueness follow by general theorems for BSDEs with Lipschitz coefficients. See e.g. [21].
Hence it only remains to prove that if we define Y (t) to be the solution of (B.1), then (B.2)
holds. To this end, define
Υ(s) = Υ(0, s).
Then by the Itoˆ formula (see e.g. [15], Ch.1)
d(Υ(t)Y (t)) =Υ(t−)dY (t) + Y (t−)dΥ(t) + d[ΥY ](t)
=Υ(t−)[−{ϕ(t) + β(t)Y (t) + ξ0(t)Z(t) +
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ν(dζ)}dt+ Z(t)dB(t)
+
∫
R
K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)] + Y (t−)Υ(t−){β(t)dt+ ξ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)}
+ Υ(t)ξ0(t)Z(t)dt+
∫
R
Υ(t−)ξ1(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
=−Υ(t)ϕ(t)dt+ (Z(t) + ξ0(t)Y (t))Υ(t)dB(t)
+
∫
R
ξ1(t, ζ))Υ(t
−)(Y (t−) +K(t, ζ))N˜(dt, dζ).
Hence, Υ(t)Y (t) +
∫ t
0
Υ(s)ϕ(s)ds is a martingale and therefore
Υ(t)Y (t) +
∫ t
0
Υ(s)ϕ(s)ds = E[FΥ(T ) +
∫ T
0
Υ(s)ϕ(s)ds | Ft]
or
Y (t) = E[F
Υ(T )
Υ(t)
+
∫ T
t
Υ(s)
Υ(t)
ϕ(s)ds | Ft],
as claimed.

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